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This article is about the problem of essentialism of natural and biologi-
cal kinds, especially species. We will primarily focus on Michael Devitt’s 
work “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism” (2008). We will try to prove 
what a good candidate for the essence of the species could be. This article 
puts the problem of essentialism into the context of biology and, through 
the usage of examples, attempts to answer that problem. We are going 
to try to defi ne essentialism and determine what meaning essentialism 
holds in biology. We will cross-check the defi nitions of essentialism and 
compare the essence of various sciences with the suggestions of essences 
of species. We are going to analyse what Hilary Putnam states about 
natural kinds, about the so-called ‘hidden structures’, and what the es-
sence of species could be. Using examples from biology, we are going to 
create a difference between ‘underlying’ and ‘exterior’ characteristics of 
organisms. We are going to analyse Devitt’s ‘Intrinsic Biological Essen-
tialism’ (2008) and check its advantages and disadvantages. Using ex-
amples from biology and using the analogy of examples from chemistry 
and biology, we will show whether Devitt’s ‘intrinsic biological essential-
ism’ is valid or not.
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1. Introduction
One of the more important discussions among biologists and philoso-
phers of biology is about the nature of species. Okasha says that the 
debate about the nature of species is still discussed and there is no 
agreement about this issue (Okasha 2002: 191).
Bird and Tobin state about essentialism:
Kripke (1971, 1972) and Putnam (1975a) use animal kinds as examples of 
natural kinds for which a posteriori essences can be found. There is some 
implication that these essences are microstructural, intrinsic properties, 
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which will be, of necessity, individually necessary and jointly suffi cient for 
an entity to be a member of a kind. However, if species are individuals, then 
it is not true that species may be individuated on the basis of the intrinsic 
properties of their members. /…/ According to the BSC, for example, mem-
bership of a species depends on relational properties, such as membership 
of a certain population and interbreeding. Alternatively, the PSC refers to 
shared descent (Bird and Tobin 2017).
What makes this specifi c kind unique and not any other is the main 
question. Putnam says that the essence of lemon lies in its ‘genetic 
code’, and this is what makes this lemon—the individual specimen of 
lemon, a member of a species—lemon (Putnam 1975: 239–240).
When it comes to the ‘genetic code’, Putnam states that: 
At the same time the sense in which to be a lemon something has to have 
the genetic code of a lemon is not the same as the technical sense (if there 
is one, which I doubt). The technical sense, I take it, would be one in which 
‘lemon’ was synonymous with a description which specifi ed the genetic code. 
But when we said (to change the example) that to be water something has 
to be H2O we did not mean, as we made clear, that the speaker has to know 
this. It is only by confusing metaphysical necessity with epistemological ne-
cessity that one can conclude that, if the (metaphysically necessary) truth-
condition for being water is being H2O, then ‘water’ must be synonymous 
with H2O—in which case it is certainly a term of science. And similarly, 
even though the predominant sense of ‘lemon’ is one in which to be a lemon 
something has to have the genetic code of a lemon (I believe), it does not 
follow that ‘lemon’ is synonymous with a description which specifi es the 
genetic code explicitly or otherwise (Putnam 1975: 240).
One of the problems “is that a natural kind may have abnormal mem-
bers” (Putnam 1975: 140).  As an example, Putnam gives the green 
lemon, which is still a member of the kind lemon 
He writes:
The supposed ‘defi ning characteristics’ of lemons are: yellow colour, tart 
taste, a certain kind of peel, etc. Why is the term ‘lemon’ not defi nable by 
simply conjoining these ‘defi ning characteristics’? The most obvious diffi -
culty is that a natural kind may have abnormal members. A green lemon is 
still a lemon—even if, owing to some abnormality, it never turns yellow. A 
three-legged tiger is still a tiger. Gold in the gaseous state is still gold. It is 
only normal lemons that are yellow, tart, etc.; only normal tigers that are 
four-legged; only gold under normal conditions that is hard, white or yellow, 
etc. (Putnam 1975: 140).
Putnam says that the existence of certain characteristics represents 
the main essential element that is common to other members of a par-
ticular natural kind (Putnam 1975: 140–141). He states:
If I describe something as a lemon, or as an acid, I indicate that it is likely 
to have certain characteristics (yellow peel, or sour taste in dilute water 
solution, as the case may be); but I also indicate that the presence of those 
characteristics, if they are present, is likely to be accounted for by some ‘es-
sential nature’ which the thing shares with other members of the natural 
kind. What the essential nature is is not a matter of language analysis but 
of scientifi c theory construction; today we would say it was chromosome 
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structure, in the case of lemons, and being a proton-donor, in the case of 
acids (Putnam 1975: 140–141).
Can we, therefore, conclude that intrinsic characteristics are the main 
essential elements of a natural kind? As Putnam claims, in some cases 
that is true. Can the same be claimed for the species, for those organ-
isms which are known for always evolving? We are going to try to anal-
yse this viewpoint. 
We will help ourselves with Putnam’s example of the atomic num-
ber of gold (Putnam 1975).
However, let us fi rst look at what Okasha writes: “Thus science has 
taught us that the real essence of gold is ‘having atomic number 79’, ac-
cording to Kripke and Putnam—this is the underlying microstructural 
property which explains why all samples of gold are shiny, yellow and 
malleable” (Okasha 2002: 194–195).
As Putnam conclude: “To sum up: if there is a hidden structure, 
then generally it determines what it is to be a member of the natural 
kind, not only in the actual world, but in all possible worlds” (Putnam 
1975: 241–242).
There is also a problem about how we classify objects. As Okasha 
states:
One possible source of philosophical opposition to a relational taxonomy 
stems from a general view about the purpose of classifying in science. /…/. 
That is a philosophical commonplace. /…/ According to a widely held view, 
what makes one classificatory scheme more fundamental than another is 
that it permits more predictively useful generalisations to be formulated 
(Okasha 2002: 207).
Okasha states that Kripke and Putnam were not incorrect when saying 
that morphological characteristics are important when defi ning species 
and these criteria are “indicative of something deeper” (Okasha 2002: 
203). Furthermore, Okasha says that: “… their error lies only in a mis-
taken view of what that ‘something deeper’ is” (Okasha 2002: 203).
We are going to provide an answer regarding essentialism when 
considering species; that is why we will start with an analysis of this 
problem, and then immerse ourselves into Devitt’s ‘intrinsic biological 
essentialism’.
2. Essentialism
 “Essentialism about species is today a dead issue”
    (Sober 1994: 163).
One of the problems of philosophy of biology is the problem of essen-
tialism. Michael Devitt begins his own article with the same quotation 
from Sober. However, is this point of view valid?
Devitt explains that the term ‘essentialism’ is unsuitable for biolo-
gists because of its connection with “Aristotelian metaphysics” (Devitt 
2008: 347).
310 U. Martinc, Devitt’s ‘Intrinsic Biological Essentialism’
Devitt in his work says:
But the essentialism I have defined need not come with those Aristotelian 
trappings. Many philosophers would be similarly reluctant because the 
term ‘essentialism’ strikes them as quaintly old-fashioned, scholastic, even 
unscientific. But such reluctance would be a merely verbal matter (Devitt 
2008: 347).
When we talk about ‘essentialism’ it is important to know that the 
problem of ‘essentialism’ will remain independent of the term.
Devitt states:
It is the issue of in virtue of what an organism is a member of a certain 
Linnaean taxon; the issue of what makes an organism a member of that 
taxon; the issue of the very nature of the taxon. I stick with ‘essentialism’ 
because it is the term that philosophers of biology use for the doctrine that 
they want to reject and I want to promote. Those who are offended by the 
term, should replace it with one of the other ways of characterizing the issue 
(Devitt 2008: 347–348).
Nevertheless, we have still not defi ned what essentialism is.
Let’s look what Robertson and Atkins says:
Essentialism in general may be characterized as the doctrine that (at least 
some) objects have (at least some) essential properties. This characteriza-
tion is not universally accepted, but no characterization is; and at least this 
one has the virtue of being simple and straightforward. (Robertson and At-
kins 2018)
Furthermore, Sober claims that essentialism: “… is a standard philo-
sophical view about natural kinds. It holds that each natural kind can 
be defi ned in terms of properties that are possessed by all and only the 
members of that kind” (Sober 2000: 148).
As already mentioned, one of the examples stemming from biology 
is the case of lemon, which was provided by Putnam. Here we can ob-
serve that he is suggesting that the essence of a species, in his case lem-
ons, is some inner structure of an organism (Putnam 1975: 140–141).
We fi nd it interesting what Ney says about essences:
A historically interesting position in metaphysics is that objects have cer-
tain properties that hold of them necessarily, so-called essential properties 
or essences. /…/ [However,] more controversial is the issue of whether ma-
terial objects like tables, chairs, or organisms have essential features (Ney 
2014: 193).
Turning back to Putnam, he argues that gold is of great signifi cance 
for us and we can use gold in different ways and for different purposes 
(Putnam 1979: 227). For example, my earrings are made of gold, the 
Golden Buddha statue is made of gold and there is also a champagne 
with fl akes of gold fl oating in it.
Sober says that the members of the same kind have to share com-
mon properties that are characteristic of that kind, and thus what is 
important is not the common history of individuals but their similarity 
(Sober 2000: 148).
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Putnam and Sober, show in their examples that the essence of gold 
is its atomic number. The important question for us is, therefore: What 
are the essential properties of species?
We could start with the example put forward by Sober. “We now 
can examine the idea that evolutionary theory refutes essentialism as 
a view about species” and that:
One argument goes like this: 
Natural kinds are immutable.
Species evolve.
Hence, species are not natural kinds. (Sober 2000: 149).
The objects made of gold, for example, gold earrings, can change while 
“the nature of gold” remains the same way, this holds, mutatis mutan-
dis, for species (Sober 2000: 149). But as Sober further states: 
Once the fi rst premise is clarifi ed in this way, we can see that the argu-
ment is fl awed. Transmutation of the elements is possible… However, this 
does not undermine the idea that the chemical elements have immutable 
essences. Likewise, the fact that a population belonging to one species can 
give rise to a population belonging to another does not refute essentialism 
about species (Sober 2000: 149–150).
We can illustrate this using speciation. Let’s look what Mayr says 
about speciation in his work Systematics and the origin of species, from 
the viewpoint of a zoologist (1942):
One part of the process of speciation is the establishment of discontinuities, 
that is, the establishment of isolating mechanisms and their perfection to 
the point where reproductive isolation is accomplished and the “parent spe-
cies” breaks up into two or more daughter species. (Mayr 1942: 23)
Furthermore, Ereshefsky says that: “In all but a few cases, speciation 
is a long and gradual process such that there is no principled way to 
draw a precise boundary between one species and the next” (Ereshef-
sky 2017).
Sober explains why essentialism is the “wrong approach regarding 
species” (Sober 2000: 151). While phenetics believe that species are 
characterize by “phenotypic or genetic similarities”, biologists who are 
in favour of different concepts, for example, Mayr’s biological concept or 
ecological-niche concept, don’t think so (Sober 2000: 151).
One of the problems is that organisms of the same species could live 
in various habitats. As Sober argues, this means that they have to ad-
just to different environmental conditions. There are some dissimilari-
ties between taxonomic ranks (species, genus, family, order) and this 
need further explanations (Sober 2000: 160).
Okasha agrees, saying that philosophers of biology acknowledge 
that “species are not individuated by essential characters” (Okasha 
2002: 196).
Moving on, we are going to endeavour to prove whether a certain 
genetic characteristic is a candidate for the essence of a species. The 
question here is also whether DNA can be the essence of a species.
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The member of the same species, for example, the members of spe-
cies mute swan (Cygnus olor) have some “genetic similarities” among 
themselves (Okasha 2002: 197).
However, if we look at human beings:
The vast majority of humans have 23 chromosome pairs, for example, while 
the primates most closely related to us normally have 24. But not all humans 
have 23 chromosome pairs—sufferers from Down’s syndrome and other ge-
netic diseases have additional chromosomes, but are still clearly human. 
As it is at the level of morphology, so it is at the chromosomal and genetic 
levels—species taxa are distinguished by clusters of covarying traits, not by 
shared essences. The idea that species can somehow be “defined in terms of 
their DNA” has no basis in biological fact, despite what many non-biologists 
appear to think (Okasha 2002: 197).
There are examples of organisms that have the same number of chro-
mosomes and are of the same species, for instance, broccoli and cab-
bage. However, there are some examples where members of the same 
species have different numbers of chromosomes. Jack jumper ant (Myr-
mecia pilosula) have 1 or 2 chromosomes, female have 2 and males 
have 1, but they still belong to the same species, Myrmecia pilosula.
Furthermore, an example from botany shows that different species 
can have the same number of chromosomes. Barley (Hordeum vulgare) 
and Garden Pea (Pisum sativum) are two different species and they 
also differ in genus, but they have the same number of chromosomes.
One of the conclusions that Okasha built from his article, with 
which we do not agree, is that: “The anti-essentialist arguments of phi-
losophers of biology show only that species cannot be defined by essen-
tial intrinsic properties” (Okasha 2002: 210).
We will, following Devitt, hope to show that this is not the fact. 
This will be done by analysing Devitt’s thesis about intrinsic property, 
his ‘intrinsic biological essentialism’, and comparing it with arguments 
from Okasha and Sober.
3. Devitt’s ‘intrinsic biological essentialism’
Essentialism is a thesis about what it is for an organism 
to be, say, a dog not a cat, not about what it is for, say, 
dogs to be a species not a genus.
   (Devitt 2008: 346)
Michael Devitt, in his article “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism” 
(2008), defends the claim that species and other taxa (genus, class, phy-
lum, and so forth) “have essences that are, at least partly, underlying 
intrinsic, mostly genetic, properties” (Devitt 2008: 344).
We will try to analyse Devitt’s view on essentialism in biology:  A 
property P is an essential property of being an F iff anything is an F 
partly in virtue of having P. A property P is the essence of being an F 
iff anything is an F in virtue of having P. The essence of being F is the 
sum of its essential properties (Devitt 2008: 345).
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Devitt argues that essence can have some variations. He says that:
Essences can be fully intrinsic; for example, the essence of being gold is 
having atomic number 79. Essences can be partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic 
and relational; for example, the essence of being a pencil is partly being an 
instrument for writing, which an object has in virtue of its relation to human in-
tentions, and partly having the sort of physical constitution that distinguishes 
it from a pen, which an object has intrinsically. Finally, essences can be fully 
relational and extrinsic; being Australian is probably an example because it 
seems that anything—Rupert Murdock, Phar Lap (a horse), the Sydney Opera 
House, a bottle of Penfolds’ Grange, the expression “no worries mate,” and so 
on—can have the property provided it stands in the right relation to Australia. 
(Devitt 2008: 345–346)
This classifi cation, especially the ‘fully intrinsic essence’, can be used 
in biology. With Linnaean taxa, Devitt points to kinds which belong to 
Linnaean hierarchy. Those are kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, 
species, subspecies, etc. He focuses on species, but claims that essen-
tialism concerns all taxa (Devitt 2008: 346).
For our discussion, it is important to know which defi nition of spe-
cies is the best so far, so that we can see what characteristics are im-
portant when defi ning species. Mayr’s defi nition (biological species con-
cept) is the most widely accepted defi nition of species. It claims that: 
“Species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural 
populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups” 
(Mayr 1942: 120).
On the other hand, Devitt presents two arguments supporting ‘in-
trinsic biological essentialism’. One is that: “Such essential properties 
seem to be part of what ‘genome projects’ are discovering” (Devitt 2008: 
351) and the second is about generalizations (Devitt 2008: 351).
Concerning generalizations, he writes:
We group organisms together under what seem, at least, to be the names 
of species or other taxa and make generalizations about the morphology, 
physiology, and behaviour of the members of these groups: about what they 
look like, about what they eat, about where they live, about what they prey 
on and are prey to, about their signals, about their mating habits, and so on 
(Devitt 2008: 351).
Devitt agrees with Sober when he says that the “essence of species” 
should tell us the basic characteristics of its members (Devitt 2008: 
353). For example, the essence of proteus (Proteus anguinus) should 
tell us the common characteristics for all its members and explain us 
why proteus is the way it is. Proteus anguinus have certain character-
istics that are typical for all its members.
Let’s look at what he says: The intrinsic difference explains the 
physiological difference. If we put together each intrinsic underlying 
property that similarly explains a similar generalization about a spe-
cies, then we have the intrinsic part of its essence (Devitt 2008: 352). 
We know that biologist classify most organisms according to their 
similarities. Devitt argues that “they do so partly on the assumption 
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that those similarities are to be explained by some intrinsic underlying 
nature of the group” (Devitt 2008: 352–353).
Devitt gives us another example, the example of the tiger. So the 
apparently superficial explanation points to the deep fact that there is 
something intrinsic, probably unknown, partly in virtue of which the 
animal is a tiger and which causes it to be striped. That something is 
an essential intrinsic property (Devitt 2008: 353).
In what follows, we will analyse whether some “underlying intrin-
sic, mostly genetic, properties” (Devitt 2008: 352) could be the essence 
of a species.
4. A candidate for the essence of species
This was not any old molecule: DNA, as Crick and I 
appreciated, holds the very key to the nature of living 
things. It stores the hereditary information that is passed 
on from one generation to the next, and it orchestrates 
the incredibly complex world of the cell.
  (Watson, Berry, and Davies 2017: xi)
If DNA “holds the very key to the nature of living things” (Watson, 
Berry, and Davies 2017: xi) then it must show us some important in-
formation about organisms and what makes an organism belong to a 
particular species. This goes together with Devitt’s idea of ‘intrinsic 
biological essentialism’.
The thesis of this article regarding the essentialism of species is 
the following: we agree that one of the essential properties regarding 
species could be Devitt’s “at least partly, underlying intrinsic, mostly 
genetic, properties” (Devitt 2008: 344).
The ideas supporting this thesis are as follows. 1. The fi rst idea is 
connected to Devitt’s argument about “genome project”, which is still 
in progress (Devitt 2008: 351). We will be using some selected authors 
from biology to make our case.
Hebert et al. write:
Genomic approaches to taxon diagnosis exploit diversity among DNA se-
quences to identify organisms (Kurtzman 1994; Wilson 1995). In a very real 
sense, these sequences can be viewed as genetic ‘barcodes’ that are embed-
ded in every cell” (Hebert, Cywinska, Ball, and deWaard 2003: 313).
This procedure of recognizing species has some restriction:
First, both phenotypic plasticity and genetic variability in the characters 
employed for species recognition can lead to incorrect identifi cations. Sec-
ond, this approach overlooks morphologically cryptic taxa … Third, since 
morphological keys are often effective only for a particular life stage or gen-
der, many individuals cannot be identifi ed. Finally, although modern inter-
active versions represent a major advance, the use of keys often demands 
such a high level of expertise that misdiagnoses are common (Hebert, Cy-
winska, Ball, and deWaard 2003: 313).
 U. Martinc, Devitt’s ‘Intrinsic Biological Essentialism’ 315
Let us examine the following idea.  2.  We want to show that the exte-
rior characteristics of an organism, the so-called morphological marks, 
are not always reliable when identifying organisms.
Some unrelated organisms could be quite similar. For instance, the 
snake—the aesculapian snake and a lizard—the slow worm.  To this 
very day, we still come across misconceptions that the slow worm is a 
snake because of the similar characteristics that these two organisms 
share. Most lizards have legs, whereas slow worms do not have them, 
thus slow worms look like snakes to laymen.
The slow worm (Anguis fragilis) is a legless lizard. “There are two 
properties by which we can distinguish the slow worm from a snake: 
the slow worm is able to blink and shed its tail.” (Plazilci Slovenije-jih 
poznamo 2018).
With this example, we are trying to show that the exterior charac-
teristics of organisms cannot be essential, as they could change due 
to various circumstances. Therefore, as this example has shown, the 
exterior marks might be misleading. We agree with the notion that the 
identifi cation on the grounds of morphology is very important, and we 
do not want to devalue this particular method, but is seems obvious 
that only morphology is not suffi cient. What follows is the examination 









Genus: Zamenis, Fitzinger, 1833








Genus: Anguis, Linnaeus, 1758
Species: A. Fragilis, Linnaeus, 1758
(Kryštufek and Janžekovič 1999)
As we can see from the above classifi cation, not only do the organisms 
belong to different species, they also belong to different families, and, 
taking it even further, according to the Linnaean hierarchy, also to dif-
ferent suborders. If morphological marks are not essential for a species, 
then the essence must be something else.
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Another example is variation among species. Map butterfl y (A. 
Levana) have the very interesting characteristic. His wing colour and 
also pattern varies and these variations are dependant on the time of 
their birth. Those who are born in summer have a different colour than 
those who are born in spring (Fric and Konvička 2002: 1018).
The examples chosen are relatively simple. We can quite easily dis-
tinguish the slow worm from a snake. There are also organisms where 
identifi cation according to morphological marks is almost impossible. 
Such species are the so-called cryptic species. Mayr defi nes that: “these 
species show the same genetic, behavioral, and ecological differences 
from traditional species as do phenotypically different species but do 
not possess the traditional taxonomic differences (Mayr 2001: 182).
That is why natural kinds must have properties that are not shared 
with other kinds, and this, according to the example of cryptic species 
(at least what exterior marks is concerned), seems not to be true.
For example, cryptic species are “very common in mycology” (Piškur 
2010: 341). If these properties could be shared with other species, then 
these properties cannot be essential for the species.
Let’s look what Piškur says:
To unravel the morphologically identical or the hard to discern complex 
of species we use an approach that is not based only on the comparison of 
nucleotide sequences of one region (e.g. of the rDNA region), but also in-
corporates analyses of other sections of the genome (for example, genes for 
elongation factor 1-a, calmodulin, -tubulin). (Piškur 2010: 341)
Devitt suggests a certain ‘underlying intrinsic’ properties of organisms 
as the essence of a species, and at the same time states that this could 
be the genetic property of an organism. Therefore, we can claim that 
the genetic properties of organisms are a good candidate for the essence 
of a species, since, as it is demonstrated by the example with snake and 
lizard, the exterior marks of an organism may be misleading when we 
want to identify organisms.
Let’s try to verify Devitt’s thesis by using an example from the fi eld 
of chemistry, i.e. an example regarding the essence of chemical ele-
ments.
The number of protons is that which determines the chemical prop-
erties of an element. So we are trying to fi nd something that can iden-
tify a species and at the same time fulfi ls the same conditions as the 
essence of chemical elements: it provides essential properties.
Analysing an example from biology that can substantiate this thesis:
According to the American Museum of Natural history scientists 
compare the DNA between organisms:
The chimpanzee and another ape, the bonobo, are humans’ closest living 
relatives. These three species look alike in many ways, both in body and 
behavior. But for a clear understanding of how closely they are related, 
scientists compare their DNA, an essential molecule that’s the instruction 
manual for building each species (American Museum of Natural History 
2018)
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When scientists analyse DNA sequences of different organisms they 
also learn about how organisms are related, which gives us more in-
formation about the relationship than about morphology (Murnaghan 
2018).
Some research shows that different models can help us identify spe-
cies. “A model COI profi le, based upon the analysis of a single individ-
ual from each of 200 closely allied species of lepidopterans, was 100% 
successful in correctly identifying subsequent specimens” (Hebert, Cy-
winska, Ball, and deWaard 2003: 313).
5. Conclusion
In this article, we tried to analyse Devitt’s ‘intrinsic biological essen-
tialism’. The problem of essentialism regarding species remains one 
of the central topics in philosophy of biology. If we can recognize that 
kinds in sciences, such as chemistry, have an essence or essential prop-
erties, then this recognition could be translated into other scientifi c 
fi elds—in this case, biology. We leaned on Devitt’s idea that species 
“have essences that are, at least partly, underlying intrinsic, mostly 
genetic, properties” (Devitt 2008: 344). If we can determine essence in 
chemical elements, then we can determine essence in species. The fact 
is that due to the increasing advancement in technology more focus 
is put on genetics and genetic research, and this determines whether 
organisms are related or not. When genetic research shows that organ-
isms are related, this means that they have some characteristics that 
all members of the group share. These characteristics are probably one 
of the essential properties of organisms, because these properties de-
fi ne a species and classify the organisms to that particular species. If 
essential properties are still unknown to us that does not mean that 
they do not exist. There remains a possibility that due to advancements 
in technology we will be able to fi nd them and this could either confi rm 
or reject Devitt’s idea about essence. Nevertheless, the already men-
tioned idea that species have essence which is based on genetic proper-
ties seems to have the most merit.
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